

## **Protest Participation Experiences and Media Uses in Urban Protests: A Conceptualization and Empirical Examination**

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The current study investigates multiple dimensions of individual participants' protest participation experiences (PPEs) and identifies different clusters involved in candlelight protests in South Korea. An online survey was conducted with 225 participants who attended at least one of the candlelight protests demanding President Park's impeachment that were held in South Korea over a span of 27 weeks in 2016 and 2017. We found that protest participants' experiences could be classified into five categories: independent, entertaining, reflective, solidary, and distributive. Based on these five PPEs, we identified three clusters of participant groups in the candlelight protests: carnivalesque, consumerist, and autonomous/critical. The three groups were different not only in terms of their PPEs but also their media use patterns and sociodemographic characteristics.

*Keywords: political participation, networked public, protest participation experiences, media use, candlelight vigil, Korea*

Participation in an urban protest is a communicative action to collectively express identities, opinions, and emotions. In recent decades, diverse protests in urban areas have emerged in different parts of the world. During the Arab Spring, the international Occupy movement, the Umbrella movement in Hong

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Kong, and the candlelight protests in South Korea, the world witnessed the ways in which individuals were mobilized for and participated in urban protests focusing on different causes, from economic equality, political democratization, and regional self-governance to calling for the impeachment of the South Korean president. Most of these protests have shared some common characteristics, such as the importance of social media for participants (Lee & Chan, 2016; Wilson & Dunn, 2011), a lower reliance on formal civic organizations (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2012), and a higher reliance on self-organizing individuals (Bennett, 2012). Scholars have discussed causes (Anderson & Mendes, 2006; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Khondker, 2011; Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damen, van Troost, & van Leeuwen, 2014; Macafee & De Simone, 2012), characteristics (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Varnelis & Friedberg, 2008), and possible outcomes (Forno, 2015; Hussain & Howard, 2013; Peterson, 2016) of these protests. However, few studies have systematically examined the actual experiences of protest participants, which we refer to in the current study as PPEs.

One important characteristic of contemporary urban protests is that they allow different clusters of participants with different motivations, orientations, and expectations to coexist in the same places. Some people may participate in protests to share their anger with other participants, but other people may participate just for the fun of being with other like-minded individuals in a festive atmosphere. Some people participate as members of civic or political groups, and others do so as just individuals who do not want to be identified as members of a group. Considering the coexistence of various groups sharing the same protest sites, it is not fair to simply define protest participants as a monolithic group sharing similar mobilization processes, motivations for participation, and PPEs without addressing the significant differences among them. Identifying multiple groups of protest participants with different PPEs is important for understanding the nature of protests in the contemporary urban places.

The purpose of this study is threefold: (1) to investigate multiple dimensions of individual participants' PPEs in the candlelight vigils in Korea between 2016 and 2017; (2) to identify clusters of participants with different mixes of PPEs in the protests; and (3) to assess effects of media-related and socioeconomic status factors on PPE clustering in the protests. The present study deals with the case of PPEs in South Korea as one of the world's most wired countries, with 94% of adults owning smartphones and 96% with Internet access, and as one of the most vibrant democracies with a very unique and successful history of democratization, all of which could be taken as important contextual factors in urban protests. Our data were collected from those who participated in a series of protests against former President Park Geun-hye in Seoul, South Korea, in 2016 and 2017. For 27 weeks between October 2016 and March 2017, people in South Korea participated in street protests in Seoul and other places throughout the country (Lim, 2017). On October 24, 2016, a cable TV news program began to report on Park's private use of her public power and other corrupt practices. An estimated 30,000 people participated in the very first candlelight protest about this issue held in the Gwanghwamun Square, Seoul, on Saturday, October 29. After that, approximately one million people attended candlelight protests every Saturday calling for the impeachment of President Park. One weekend, it was reported by the Korean news media that the number of protesters went up to 2.32 million throughout the country. The candlelight protests were held every weekend, even after the court decided to remove Park on March 10, 2017, ending with the 23rd candlelight protest on April 29, 2017. Most participants voluntarily participated in the protests, regardless of tough winter weather. The

sounds of songs and speeches filled the protest sites. Surprisingly, there was no violence during the protests, and the demonstrations were all very peaceful.

### **Types of Protest Participation Experiences**

PPE is closely related to participation motivation since the reasons people participate in a protest would at least partially influence what people actually experience in it even though it seems obvious that motivation and experience are not always perfectly correlated. Previous studies have identified several social movement participation motivations (Klandermans, 1997; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; Walgrave, Van Laer, Verhulst, & Wouters, 2013). Among them, we can mention at least four types of motivations: instrumental, collective identity, emotional expression, and sharing views and opinions. The first is instrumental motivation (Walgrave et al., 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). With instrumental motivations, individuals may focus on what they would get from protest participation investing time, effort, energy, and various resources (Brady, Verba, & Scholzman, 1995; Klandermans 1997, 2004; Olson, 1971). People decide to participate in a protest when they believe benefits surpass costs. The second motivation is collective identity (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). People may decide to join a protest to confirm and reconfirm their group identity, have a sense of belonging, and feel a sense of solidarity with others (Earl, 2015; Somma, 2010; Toepfl, 2018) instead of merely focusing on instrumental goals. The third motivation is emotional expression (Jasper, 1998). Some individuals may decide to participate in a protest primarily because they want to express emotions such as anger, resentment, sympathy, or affection (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). The fourth motivation is sharing views and opinions with others (Tilly & Wood, 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). Individuals with some political standing and their own views on a certain issue would like to participate in a protest to “speak publicly on the issues at hand” (Tilly & Wood, 2013, p. 35).

These participation motives—instrumental, collective identity, emotional expression, and sharing views—would influence (but not determine) PPEs. Thus, we can learn from the motivation literature how to discuss possible types of protest experiences. Based on the motivation types briefly mentioned above and on some recent discussions about collective behaviors (Bennett, 2012; Bimber et al., 2012; Shirky, 2008), we can conceptualize several possible PPE types. For example, we can make a list of PPEs: collectivistic (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000; Walgrave et al., 2013), instrumental (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007), solidarity-seeking (Blumer, 1939; Gamson, 1991), hierarchical (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2015; Zald, & Berger, 1978), emotional-expressive (Calhoun, 2001), fun-seeking (Long & Harris, 1993), autonomous (Fantasia, 1988; Klandermans et al., 2014), distributive (Shirky, 2008), reflective (Archer, 2007), and discursive (Habermas, 1981) PPEs. Some people participate in protests with clear group identities (collectivistic), enjoying being with like-minded people (solidarity-seeking), sharing grievances with others (emotional-expressive), and following protest leaders and accepting shared causes (hierarchical), although others participate in a protest with personal identities rather than group identities (autonomous), keeping personal autonomy in a decentralized and nonhierarchical structure (distributive) in a festive environment (fun-seeking) and self-criticizing the causes and methods of the protest that they belong to (self-reflective and discursive) rather than blindly approving them. In the contemporary urban protests, there is a much wider repertoire of protest experiences, and people can choose what they want from this repertoire. Individual participants standing next to one another at a protest site can have very different experiences depending on

what PPE repertoire they choose. In our first research question, we ask how individuals' PPEs were categorized and which are prevalent in the contemporary urban protests in Korea.

*RQ1: What types of PPEs did participants in the candlelight vigils in 2016 and 2017 in Korea experience?*

### **Clusters of Participants in the Protests**

Once we determine the repertoire of available PPEs, our next step is to identify distinct clusters of protest participants based on their different PPEs. Other studies have categorized protesters based on various indicators such as participation history, frequency, intensity, or persistence (Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Kanter, 1968; Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, & Rootes, 2012; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2009). Considering that individual participants can have different PPEs in the same protest site, it is meaningful to identify the categories of people based on PPEs. For example, even in the same protest site, some people may treat the protest as a public sphere wherein they can freely and rationally discuss communal issues (Lee, Kim, & Wainwright, 2010), but others consider it as a large concert where individuals enjoy being with others (Bruner, 2005; Lee et al., 2010), a town hall meeting involving deliberative democracy, where individuals can exercise their critical citizenship (Lee et al., 2010), a shop of "issues" where individuals focus on their own personal desires while remaining independent as individuals even among a huge crowd, a meeting place of networked individuals who are only partially present (and partially absent) in the protest while connecting to others who are "not there," or a temporary platform where networked publics are temporarily and physically copresent, becoming invisible when the show ends (Kim, 2017).

One potentially critical factor in the formation of multiple clusters in protests may be different media use patterns. Along with social, political, and cultural changes in our society, new media technologies, such as mobile phones and social media, have been the driving forces of the contemporary urban protests. As Bennett and Segerberg (2011) suggested in their studies of the G20 London Summit protests, various mobile, networked, and "personalized" communication technologies allowed even loosely connected individuals to experience a strong sense of solidarity. Individuals have more control than ever before over whether they connect with others to form an ad hoc public (Varnelis & Friedberg, 2008); even individuals who are not usually interested in participating in public discussions about communal issues can easily become interested in participating in organized public actions, either online or offline, whenever a relevant issue is raised, or whenever they like (e.g., Caren & Gaby, 2011). This heightened public control has been made possible by mobile, networked, and personalized media technologies. Therefore, individuals may be clustered into different groups that have different PPEs depending on how they use media technologies, including both new and old platforms.

An extensive number of studies have demonstrated the positive relationships between traditional news media usage and civic participation (Chan, 2017; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Eveland, Shah, & Kwak, 2003) and more recently between social media and civic participation (Boyle & Schmierbach, 2009; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2019; Mansour, 2012; Ndavula & Mberia, 2012; Pang & Goh, 2015; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2014; Yun & Chang, 2011). We can expect that some participant groups depend more on traditional media although other groups depend more on

social media when participating in protests. The use of social media has been discussed as a factor that facilitates protest experiences by providing and sharing mobilizing information, which is limited by traditional media (Gerbaudo, 2012; Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2016; Pang & Goh, 2015; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2014). These studies have focused on the fact that protest participants can produce and disseminate pictures, videos, and messages of the protest to the public at crucial moments via social media (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012) and that this documentation and sharing of the protest increase citizen connectivity by constructing a sense of togetherness and emotional space wherein collective action can unfold (Gerbaudo, 2012). Individual participants even play the role of citizen journalists in moments of the protest (Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2016). More specifically, we can expect that social media dependency (Kim & Jung, 2017) will be more salient for those who tend to have individualized, entertaining, reflexive, or less-hierarchical protest experiences, although traditional media dependency (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984) is likelier to be connected to participant groups with more traditional types of protest participation, emphasizing solidarity, unity, hierarchical structure, and group identity. Since previous studies have not specified how the uses of different types of media are related to the ways that individuals are clustered into different groups in protests, we ask this as a research question.

Another question we may ask about multiple groups in a protest relates to the distinct ways in which they participate. First, the different ways in which a person sees and experiences a protest affect how often they participate. Frequent participation should serve as a good indicator of high involvement in and commitment to a protest (Lee & Chan, 2016; Schussmann & Soule, 2005). Second, one interesting pattern of participation in the candlelight protests in Korea is that an increasing number of people participated in them alone. This might be the influence of a new trend emphasizing personal autonomy, individualism, and active expression. It is important to determine whether solitary protest participation is related to how individual participants are clustered into different groups.

In addition, we can also consider socioeconomic status as factors in the formation of multiple clusters. Previous studies have demonstrated that demographic variables are related to civic participation. For example, people with a higher socioeconomic status (e.g., measured by education or income) are likelier to participate (Brady et al., 1995; Peterson, 1990; Verba & Nie, 1972). In general, older people are likelier to participate than younger people (Best & Krueger, 2005; Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012), although younger people are likelier to be familiar with methods of seeking political information and participating online than older people (Cohen, Kahne, Bowyer, Middaugh, & Rogowski, 2012; Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006). Other studies have suggested that there are gender differences in civic participation (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2010; Norris, 2002; Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). For example, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) found that women were likelier to engage in private activism, such as signing petitions and making donations, but men were likelier to engage in collective political and direct-contact activism, such as attending political protests, contacting politicians or media outlets, and joining Internet forums. We do not yet know how socioeconomic and demographic variables influence the ways in which protest participants are clustered into different groups based on different PPEs in urban protests. Below we added more research questions.

*RQ2: What different clusters exist among the participants in the candlelight vigils in 2016 and 2017 in Korea?*

*RQ3: Are media use patterns related to the ways that individuals are clustered into different groups in the candlelight vigils?*

*RQ4: Are protest participation patterns (e.g., frequency or solitary participation) related to the ways that individuals are clustered into different groups in the candlelight vigils?*

*RQ5: Are demographic factors related to the ways in which individuals are clustered into different groups in the candlelight vigils?*

## **Methods**

### ***Procedure and Participants***

We conducted an online survey from June 16–20, 2017, with 1,000 respondents, aged 19–69 years, in South Korea. The survey respondents were sampled from the online panel directory of a third-party research firm that includes approximately 1,265,000 people. We sent email invitations to 13,268 potential respondents who were randomly selected from the panel directory. Of these respondents, 2,874 visited the survey Web page; of those who visited the Web page, 1,000 completed the survey. The participation rate was 7.5%, and the completion rate was 34.8%. As this study focuses on people's experiences in the candlelight protests in Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul during 2016 and 2017, we use the sub-sample ( $n = 225$ ) of the respondents who participated in the protests at least once within the previous six months. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample.

### ***Measurement***

#### *Protest Participation Experiences*

To measure individuals' PPEs, we developed measurement items based on existing studies (e.g., Bennett, 2012; Choi, 2017), anecdotal stories found in various media articles, and unsystematic interviews with protest participants. Participants were asked to respond to 15 statements, such as "I participated in the protests only because I wanted to," "I participated in the protests to feel as if I were at a concert or a cultural event," and "It is important for all protest participants to share a unified opinion about an issue," on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. The measurement items of PPEs are listed in Table 2.

#### *Media Use*

Based on the media system dependency theory (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984; Kim & Jung, 2017), we use a media dependency measure rather than time or frequency measures to assess media use. Media dependency was measured by asking how important each media type, including Social Networking Services (SNSs) and traditional media, was for respondents to achieve important, everyday goals. Previous studies (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984; Jung, Qiu, & Kim, 2001; Kim & Jung, 2017) have emphasized

that time and frequency measures have become unstable for measuring media use in the new media environment, although media dependency measures fit better to capture the structural and dynamic relationships between individual users and various media types in their everyday lives. As a simplified way to measure individual-level media dependency relations, we asked respondents how useful traditional media, such as national broadcast TV ( $M = 3.65$ ,  $SD = .92$ ), cable TV ( $M = 3.72$ ,  $SD = .84$ ), and radio ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = .93$ ), and SNSs, e.g., Facebook ( $M = 2.68$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ), Twitter ( $M = 1.84$ ,  $SD = 1.17$ ), Instagram ( $M = 1.84$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ) and KakaoTalk ( $M = 4.04$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ) were for achieving everyday goals. Respondents were asked to answer using a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all useful) to 5 (very useful).

#### *SNS Positing During Protests*

To assess the degree to which individuals used social media during protests, we asked participants to respond to the following question: "During protests, how often did you write and share posts about the protests using your mobile devices?" The respondents provided their answers using a 5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very frequently;  $M = 2.17$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ).

#### *Protest Participation Frequency and Mode*

We measured participation frequency by asking respondents to report how many times they participated in candlelight protests over the previous six months (range 1–15,  $M = 2.68$ ,  $SD = 2.29$ ). Regarding the participation mode, we asked respondents whether they participated in the protests alone at least once (= 1) or not (= 0). Of the respondents, 28% reported having participated alone.

*Sociodemographic variables.* Sociodemographic variables, such as gender, age, education, income, and political orientation, were measured. A summary of the descriptive statistics of these variables is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic and Other Control Variables.**

	Frequency	%
Gender		
Male	139	61.78
Female	86	38.22
Age		
20–29	53	23.56
30–39	46	20.44
40–49	57	25.33
50–59	47	20.89
60–69	22	9.78
Education achievement		
High school graduate or lower	40	17.78
College student/graduate	166	73.78
Graduate student or higher	19	8.44
Monthly income		
< US\$2,000	19	8.44
US\$2,000–US\$4,000	81	36.00
US\$4,000–US\$6,000	56	24.89
US\$6,000–US\$8,000	37	16.44
US\$8,000–US\$10,000	20	8.89
> US\$10,000	12	5.33
Political conservativeness (Range: 1–7)		
Progressive (1, 2, 3)	121	53.78
Neutral (4)	70	31.11
Conservative (5, 6, 7)	34	15.11

Note. Monthly income was asked in Korean won but is reported here in U.S. dollars.  $N = 225$ .

### **Analyses**

The analyses of the current study were conducted on two levels: the experience level and the group level. At the experience level, we tried to find the latent structure of protest participation experiences based on 15 experience items measured in our survey (see Table 2). At the group level, we attempted to identify different groups clustered based on different mixes of PPEs. To answer RQ1 at the experience level and investigate the dimensions of PPEs in candlelight protests, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation ( $\delta = 0$ ). To answer RQ2 at the group level, which is about identifying distinctive groups of protestors based on the similarity of experience dimensions we determined from the factor analysis, we conducted a hierarchical agglomerative cluster (HAC) analysis using Ward's method, which is known to perform better than other clustering methods when clusters are of similar sizes (Ferreira & Hitchcock, 2009; Hands & Everitt, 1987). Because the appropriate determination of the number of clusters is an important issue in cluster analysis (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2009), we performed a K-means cluster analysis to warrant the defined number of clusters for the HCA



(Milligan & Cooper, 1985). After identifying the clusters, we conducted an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and a negative binomial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to compare the groups by demographic variables, media use, and participation frequency and mode.

**Table 2. Factor Analysis of Protest Participation Experiences.**

Items	Factors				
	I <sup>1</sup>	E <sup>2</sup>	R <sup>3</sup>	S <sup>4</sup>	D <sup>5</sup>
It was my own decision to participate in the protests.	.84	-.02	.00	.08	-.03
I participated in the protests only because I wanted to.	.89	.00	-.05	.04	.07
I participated in the protests just as an individual rather than a member of a group.	.65	.05	-.04	-.05	-.19
I was able to participate in the protests alone.	.55	.00	.13	.08	-.15
I participated in the protests to feel as if I were in a concert or a cultural event.	-.17	.76	.07	.05	-.09
I participated in the protests because it was fun and interesting.	.15	.64	-.02	-.04	.07
I participated in the protests because I enjoyed the festive atmospheres.	-.02	.83	-.05	.05	-.03
Sometimes I had a critical attitude toward other participants in the protest.	-.04	.10	.82	-.04	.00
Some of the opinions of other protest participants should be criticized.	.20	-.03	.68	-.09	.05
Sometimes, I had critical opinions toward the organizers of the protests.	-.13	-.06	.62	.08	-.06
Participants should follow the opinion of the entire protest group once it is made.	-.16	.08	.02	.71	-.12
It is important for all protest participants to share a unified opinion about an issue.	.12	-.14	-.09	.79	.02
There should be an organizing group to unify protest participants.	.14	.16	.05	.57	.10
Individuals rather than established organizations should lead the protests.	.13	.01	.20	.02	-.54
The protests could've been well led by individual participants, even without any leadership role of civic organizations.	.07	.02	-.09	-.01	-.80
Eigenvalue	3.66	2.29	2.16	1.47	1.08
Variance explained (%)	24.38	15.26	14.39	9.78	7.20

Note. Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation method was used.  $N = 225$ . The factor loadings higher than +/- .50 are shaded.

<sup>1</sup> Independent. <sup>2</sup> Entertaining. <sup>3</sup> Reflexive. <sup>4</sup> Solidary. <sup>5</sup> Distributive.

## Results

RQ1 focused on the subdimensions of PPEs during candlelight protests in South Korea. To identify the factor structure of PPEs, we conducted an EFA. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic of sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.75) and Bartlett's test of sphericity ( $\chi^2 = 1182.10$ ,  $df = 105$ ,  $p < .001$ ) indicated that the correlations between the variables were suitable for the analysis and that our sample was generally adequate for factor analysis. The EFA results produced five sets of PPE factors, which we evaluated using the Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue 1.0 and a factor loading of greater than 0.50. The five factors accounted for 71% of the variance. As shown in Table 2, five factors had a clear structure of underlying experiences associated with protest participation. After reviewing the items included in each factor, we named the factors as follows: independent, entertaining, reflective, solidary, and distributive. The reliability of these items was high enough (independent: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .84$ ; entertaining: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .79$ ; reflective: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .74$ ; solidary: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .73$ ; distributive: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .67$ ) to warrant face-validity of the measurement items. Some of these factors correlated with one another (independent–solidary: Pearson's  $r = .22$ ,  $p < .001$ ; independent–distributive: Pearson's  $r = .40$ ,  $p < .001$ ; entertaining–solidary: Pearson's  $r = .26$ ,  $p < .001$ ; entertaining–distributive: Pearson's  $r = .14$ ,  $p < .05$ ; reflective–distributive: Pearson's  $r = .25$ ,  $p < .001$ ; solidary–distributive: Pearson's  $r = .16$ ,  $p < .05$ ), suggesting that such experiences are not necessarily mutually exclusive but complementary.

RQ2 focuses on identifying different groups of protest participants that coexisted during protests. To classify participants, we conducted a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis. The dendrogram produced from this analysis shows the clusters at each stage of the agglomerating process, and three groups were clustered graphically. We used the "NbClust" function of the R language, which provided up to 30 "goodness of clustering" indices to determine the optimal number of clusters (Charrad, Ghazzali, Boiteau, & Niknafs, 2014). As a result, 26 determination indices were calculated, and the results indicated that three is the best number of clusters for our HCA. We also conducted a K-means cluster analysis to cross-validate the cluster number. As the K-means clustering also suggested three as the best number of clusters, we concluded that three was the optimal number of clusters.

To determine how different each group was in terms of PPEs, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA; see Table 3). The ANCOVA test and post hoc analyses revealed the distinctive characteristics of each cluster group. We named each cluster "carnavalesque," "consumerist," and "autonomous/critical" considering which PPE scores in one cluster group were relatively higher or lower than those in other cluster groups.

Cluster 1 was named after Bakhtin's carnivalesque (Bakhtin, 1984; Park, 2013) concept, because its participants seemed likelier to freely express their opinions in a celebratory manner during the candlelight protests than those in the other two groups. Participants in this group had the most entertaining (adj M = 3.41, SEM = .09) and the most solidary (adj M = 3.91, SEM = .08) participation experiences among the people in the three groups. They were placed second in terms of independent (adj M = 4.27, SEM = .06) and reflective (adj M = 2.93, SEM = .08) experiences. Cluster 2 was named "consumerist" because its participants seemed more concerned about simply consuming the images and

spectacle of the candlelight political events than those in other groups. They ranked lowest in independent (adj M = 3.52, SEM = .07), reflective (adj M = 2.53, SEM = .09), and distributive experiences (adj M = 2.71, SEM = .08). Cluster 3 was named "autonomous/critical" because protesters in this group scored highest in independent (adj M = 4.52, SEM = .07) and reflective (adj M = 3.50, SEM = .10) experiences.

We compared the three groups for media use variables (RQ3) by conducting ANCOVA analyses. As Table 3 shows, we found differences among the three groups in SNS posting during protests ( $F = 4.94, p < .01$ ), dependency on Twitter ( $F = 6.50, p < .01$ ), dependency on cable TV ( $F = 2.50, p < .10$ ), and dependency on radio ( $F = 3.22, p < .01$ ). Post hoc analysis results showed that the consumerist group (adj M = 1.83, SEM = .13) ranked lowest of the three groups in terms of SNS posting during protests. The carnivalesque group (adj M = 2.17, SEM = .13) showed higher dependency on Twitter than the consumerist group (adj M = 1.50, SEM = .13). There were no differences among the three groups in terms of dependency on other SNSs, such as Facebook, Instagram, or KakaoTalk. The consumerist group (adj M = 3.88, SEM = .10) showed a higher dependency on cable TV than the autonomous/critical group at a marginally significant level (adj M = 3.56, SEM = .11). The carnivalesque group favored radio (adj M = 3.42, SEM = .10) more than the autonomous/critical group (adj M = 3.02, SEM = .12).

We also compared the three groups in terms of the variables related to individuals' protest participation patterns, including participation frequency and participation mode (i.e., whether they were participating alone, RQ4). The variable of participation frequency followed negative binomial distribution (dispersion  $\phi = 1.38$ ); therefore, it was tested using a negative binomial regression analysis. Significant differences were found among the participant groups in two protest participation pattern variables (participation frequency:  $\chi^2 = 6.79, df = 2, p < .05$ ; participated alone:  $F = 3.15, p < .05$ ). The carnivalesque group showed the highest participation frequency (adj M = 3.09, SEM = .09) of all the groups. Individuals in the autonomous/critical group (adj M = .38, SEM = .06) were likelier to participate in the candlelight protests alone than those in the consumerist group (adj M = .19, SEM = .05).

Lastly, we compared the three participant groups in terms of sociodemographic variables (see Table 3, RQ5). Individuals in the carnivalesque group ( $M = 45.44, SD = 11.83$ ) were likelier to be older than those in the consumerist group ( $M = 37.87, SD = 11.43$ ). The individuals in the autonomous/critical group ( $M = 4.03, SD = .47$ ) were likelier to have higher education levels ( $F = 2.86, p < .10$ ) than those in the consumerist group ( $M = 3.83, SD = .44$ ). The group with the highest average income was the autonomous/critical group ( $M = 6.27, SD = 2.52$ ). The three groups did not show any differences in terms of gender or political orientation.

**Table 3. Comparison of Three Clusters.**

Characteristics		Cluster 1:	Cluster 2:	Cluster 3:	F
		Carnavalesque (N = 86)	Consumerist (N = 76)	Autonomous/ Critical (N = 63)	
		Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	
Participation	Independent	4.27 (.06) <sub>b</sub>	3.52 (.07) <sub>c</sub>	4.52 (.07) <sub>a</sub>	55.11 <sup>***</sup>
Experiences	Entertaining	3.41 (.09) <sub>a</sub>	2.56 (.09) <sub>b</sub>	2.32 (.10) <sub>b</sub>	39.81 <sup>***</sup>
	Reflective	2.93 (.08) <sub>b</sub>	2.53 (.09) <sub>c</sub>	3.50 (.10) <sub>a</sub>	26.93 <sup>***</sup>
	Solidary	3.91 (.08) <sub>a</sub>	3.24 (.08) <sub>b</sub>	3.07 (.09) <sub>b</sub>	31.17 <sup>***</sup>
	Distributive	3.87 (.07) <sub>a</sub>	2.71 (.08) <sub>b</sub>	3.66 (.09) <sub>a</sub>	59.57 <sup>***</sup>
	Socio-demographics	Gender (female = 1)	.37 (.49)	.42 (.50)	.35 (.48)
	Age	45.44 (11.83) <sub>a</sub>	37.87 (11.43) <sub>b</sub>	41.41 (13.19)	7.94 <sup>***</sup>
	Education	3.85 (.66)	3.83 (.44) <sub>b</sub>	4.03 (.47) <sub>a</sub>	2.86 <sup>#</sup>
	Income	5.14 (2.59) <sub>b</sub>	5.12 (2.50) <sub>b</sub>	6.27 (2.52) <sub>a</sub>	4.56 <sup>*</sup>
	Political conservatism	3.31 (1.20)	3.57 (.98)	3.38 (1.05)	1.13
Media Use	Dependency on Facebook	2.71 (.15)	2.69 (.16)	2.61 (.17)	.02
	Dependency on Twitter	2.17 (.13) <sub>b</sub>	1.50 (.13) <sub>a</sub>	1.79 (.15)	6.50 <sup>**</sup>
	Dependency on Instagram	1.98 (.14)	1.66 (.15)	1.86 (.16)	1.25
	Dependency on KakaoTalk	4.03 (.12)	4.06 (.13)	4.03 (.14)	.02
	Dependency on newspapers	3.51 (.11)	3.47 (.12)	3.29 (.13)	.97
	Dependency on TV	3.56 (.10)	3.82 (.10)	3.57 (.11)	2.05
	Dependency on cable TV	3.71 (.09)	3.88 (.10) <sub>a</sub>	3.56 (.11) <sub>b</sub>	2.50 <sup>#</sup>
	Dependency on radio	3.42 (.10) <sub>a</sub>	3.24 (.11)	3.02 (.12) <sub>b</sub>	3.22 <sup>*</sup>
	SNS posting during protests	2.39 (.12) <sub>a</sub>	1.83 (.13) <sub>b</sub>	2.30 (.15) <sub>a</sub>	4.94 <sup>**</sup>
	Protest Participation Pattern	Participation frequency	3.09 (.09) <sub>a</sub>	2.33 (.09) <sub>b</sub>	2.42 (.10) <sub>b</sub>
	Participated alone (participated = 1)	.28 (.05)	.19 (.05) <sub>b</sub>	.38 (.06) <sub>a</sub>	3.15 <sup>*</sup>

Note. Means with different subscripts across rows were significantly different in Tukey post hoc tests. For the analysis of participation experiences, media use, and protest participation pattern variables, socio-demographic variables were set to means; adjusted means and standard errors were shown for these variables. Participation frequency follows negative binomial distribution; + value indicates Chi-squares ( $\chi^2$ ) with  $df = 2$ .

#  $p < .10$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .0$

### Discussion

We had three purposes in this study: (1) to investigate the multiple dimensions of individual participants' PPEs in the candlelight protests in 2016 and 2017 in South Korea; (2) to identify different clusters of participants in the protests; and (3) to test whether media use, participation pattern, and socioeconomic status factors affect PPE clustering in the protests. We classified the types of PPEs into five categories: independent, entertaining, reflective, solidary, and distributive. Based on these five PPEs, we identified three clusters of participant groups in the candlelight protests: carnivalesque, consumerist, and autonomous/critical.

The current study empirically demonstrates that different groups of individual participants had different sets of PPEs at the same protest sites. Even if the protest took place in a shared site (e.g., Gwanghwamun Square in downtown Seoul) and had one common goal (e.g., the impeachment of the president), individuals' participation experiences at the protest varied. We should not consider the crowd at the protests to be a unified group. Even in the same protest site there could be multiple protests occurring, made up of multiple, invisibly divided groups of protestors such as carnivalesque, consumerist, or autonomous/critical groups. The Carnivalesque group showed a mix of PPEs that include collectivistic (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000), solidarity-seeking (Gamson, 1991), emotional-expressive (Calhoun, 2001), fun-seeking (Long & Harris, 1993), and discursive (Habermas, 1981) experiences. The consumerist group's PPEs included instrumental (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007), autonomous (Fantasia, 1988), and distributive (Shirky, 2008) experiences. The autonomous/critical group showed a combination of instrumental, autonomous, distributive, reflective (Archer, 2007), and discursive PPEs. However, it seems that any PPEs related to hierarchical relationships or interactions were not prevalent among the participants in the candlelight vigils in Seoul.

The three protest groups identified in the current study reflect parallel groups divided by their own historical experiences and sociopolitical positions in Korean society. For example, the carnivalesque group largely reflects the characteristics of what Koreans have called the "86 generation," who experienced the student protests for democratization during the 1980s. Most of these protesters are currently in their 40s and 50s. They are relatively liberal, and they still have nostalgic, personal memories of the democratization protests during the 1980s. They are ready to enjoy mass demonstrations. Most people in the consumerist group are in their 20s and 30s. They may go to the protests much like they go to shopping malls. They are highly selective about their protest participation and which issues they pay attention to (Hasebrink & Paus-Hasebrink, 2007). They remain passive followers in protests until they see issues that are relevant to their lives. If the people in the carnivalesque group seem like the crowd at a soccer game, those in the consumerist group seem like TV viewers who keep changing channels until they find something interesting. Most people in the autonomous/critical group belong to the South Korean middle class. Many of those in this group may still see themselves as conservative. They may have agreed with other people at the candlelight protests that President Park should have been impeached; however, they may have had different ideas about how the protests should have been organized and about other political, economic, and social claims discussed by other (more liberal) participants.

The three groups were different not only in terms of their PPEs but also in their media use patterns and sociodemographic characteristics. The carnivalesque group showed relatively higher scores in solitary, entertaining, and distributed participation experiences than the other groups. People who belonged to this group were likelier to use SNSs actively (especially Twitter), to post on SNSs during protests, to show higher protest participation frequency, and to be older. The consumerist cluster consisted of those who were less likely to have independent and distributive participation experiences. People in the consumerist group were less likely to use SNSs during protests and were likelier to be younger. Lastly, people in the autonomous/critical group demonstrated high levels of SNS use and actively posted on SNSs during protests; and they were likelier to have reflexive participation experiences, to participate in protests alone, and to have higher education and income levels than those in other groups.

Most importantly, the current study shows that changing protest experiences are related to media use patterns. By using mobile phones and social media, protest participants can connect with other participants and nonparticipants who are not at the protest site. Our study, as well as others (e.g., Tufekci & Wilson, 2012), showed that protesters share their live experiences of protest participation with others via social media. Social media can be used to mobilize people to attend protests (Mercea, 2014; Schussmann & Soule, 2005) and to connect them to online and offline activities (Lee & Chan, 2016). The carnivalesque group in our study was particularly active in their use of social media both in their everyday lives and at protest sites. They actively shared their PPEs with others. On the other hand, the consumerist group was less likely to share their participation experiences with others. Future research should examine the dynamic uses of various media (especially mobile and social media) more systematically before, during, and after protests to better understand the experiences of networked citizenship in today's media environment.

Some of the participants seem to have experienced the protests as a member of "networked publics" (boyd, 2011; Kim, 2017; Varnelis & Friedberg, 2008), or a public connected through mobile phones and social media. For example, participants in the carnivalesque and autonomous/critical groups actively wrote and shared posts about live protest situations. These protestors might be connected to others across geographical distances through their mobile devices. They were made up of networked individuals (Wellman et al., 2003). These networked individuals formed a dynamic type of public in the city streets. They discussed with others what had been happening before they came to the square, and many of them continued discussing issues after the protest. On site, they talked with others around them, and, while listening to speakers on the stage, they tended to critically and selectively receive messages. They posted texts, pictures, or videos and shared their ideas, thoughts, and opinions offline and online. Many of them were active storytellers, and they embodied a public that used to be invisible by nature but that became visible at the protest sites. However, some of them (especially the autonomous/critical group) were not tied to formal organizations (e.g., civic organizations or labor unions). They show a trend of personalization of collective action (Bennett, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2011). Thus, we can call some of the protestors' experiences shared experiences of networked publics in place, or place-based networked publics (Kim, 2017). However, not everyone in Gwanghwamun Square belonged to the networked public. Many still enjoyed place-based solidarity and collective sharing of emotions, opinions, and actions with others who shared the same place.

How likely are the results of the current study generalizable to protests found in places other than Korea? To some degree, in most recent protests around the world we may find groups similar to the

carnavalesque group that emphasize enjoying festive and solidary atmospheres in a protest; groups similar to the consumerist group who are much more rational, utilitarian, and practical in their protest participation; and groups similar to the autonomous/critical group who try to be independent and self-reflective about their own participation and critical about the protest process as a whole. It is also highly likely that we would find different types of clusters and PPE types from other places. However, the PPE types and participants' clusters identified in the current study can still be used as references that future studies, especially those conducted in social contexts other than Korea, can use to compare their findings with.

Some caution is needed when interpreting the results of this study. Our sample was not randomly selected from those who participated in the candlelight protests. Therefore, our sample may not represent the actual protest participants. This study was based on cross-sectional data; all the findings in this study were correlational. Thus, all the causal statements in the text should be read with caution. Our measures of media use were rather simple, and they did not capture what people do with media content and why. Future studies should develop measures to capture media use experiences before and during protests and explore how media use shapes PPEs. Even with these potential limitations, this study showed the diversity of political participation experiences and identified multiple participant groups and the roles of various media on protest experiences, which could facilitate more systematic research to add to our understanding of PPEs in the 21st century.

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978 Y. Kwon, Y.-C. Kim, E. Shin, A. Cho, and J.H. Kim International Journal of Communication 14(2020)

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